Abstract. Decorrelation Theory deals with general adversaries who are mounting iterated attacks, i.e., attacks in which an adversary is allowed to make d queries in each iteration with the aim of distinguishing a random cipher C from the ideal random cipher C * . A bound for a non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d, who is making plaintext (resp. ciphertext) queries, against a 2d-decorrelated cipher has already been derived by Vaudenay at EUROCRYPT '99. He showed that a 2d-decorrelated cipher resists against iterated non-adaptive distinguishers of order d when iterations have almost no common queries. More recently, Bay et al. settled two open problems arising from Vaudenay's work at CRYPTO '12, yet they only consider non-adaptive iterated attacks. Hence, a bound for an adaptive iterated adversary of order d, who can make both plaintext and ciphertext queries, against a 2d-decorrelated cipher has not been studied yet. In this work, we study the resistance against this distinguisher and we prove the bound for an adversary who is making adaptive plaintext and ciphertext queries depending on the previous queries to an oracle.
Introduction
Attempting to provide provable security to block cipher cryptanalysis, Nyberg [Nyb91] pioneered a new direction where the notion of strength against differential cryptanalysis is formally examined. Similarly, Chabaud and Vaudenay [CV94] examined the notion of strength against linear cryptanalysis. Luby and Rackoff [LR85, LR86] have also considered a Feistel scheme with a random round function and defined the notion of k-wise independent hash function families. The caveat with their approach is that very long secret keys are required. Carter and Wegman [CW79, CW81] , however, require smaller key when measuring the effects of pseudorandomness against the adversaries.
Inspired by the notion of k-wise independence of Luby and Rackoff and the derandomization techniques of Carter and Wegman in sampling pairwise independent numbers, Vaudenay defined and formalized Decorrelation Theory [Vau99c, Vau03] to provide provable security for block ciphers against a wide range of statistical attacks. Indeed perfect decorrelation of order d is equivalent to the d-wise independence of Luby and Rackoff while appropriate norms and measures are defined for imperfect decorrelation in [Vau98a, Vau99a] . Moreover, Decorrelation Theory covers a variety of statistical attacks such as Differential and Linear Attacks, Boomerang Attacks, Truncated Differential Attacks, and Impossible Differential Attacks. However, the attacks covered in Decorrelation Theory are generic attacks complying a certain broad criteria in the Luby and Rackoff model. Decorrelation Theory considers computationally unbounded attackers who can make d queries in each iteration. When these d queries are random and independent from one another, the attacker is a d-limited non-adaptive adversary. In contrast, one can consider adaptive adversaries who choose their queries depending on the previous ones. Then, a distinguisher of order d is trying to distinguish between a random cipher C and the ideal random cipher C * using the aforementioned adversary.
Non-adaptive iterated distinguishers, making plaintext (resp. ciphertext) queries, have been studied in [Vau98b, Vau99b, Vau99c, Vau98a, BV05] extensively, and the security of many block ciphers has been proven by decorrelation techniques, see for example [PV98, Vau03, BF06a, BF06b] . In particular, Vaudenay [Vau99c, Vau03] finds an upper bound for the advantage of a non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d, who is making plaintext (resp. ciphertext) queries against a 2d-decorrelated cipher. He shows that a 2d-decorrelated cipher resists against iterated non-adaptive attacks of order d when iterations have almost no common queries. His work has been followed by Bay et al. [BMV12] who address two open problems arising from Vaudenay [Vau99c, Vau03] on non-adaptive iterated attacks. When considering resistance against non-adaptive iterated adversaries of order d who are making only plaintext (resp. ciphertext) queries, Bay et al. showed that not only it is sufficient for a cipher to have decorrelation of order 2d, but this decorrelation order is also necessary. Moreover, they proved that repeating a plaintext query in different iterations may provide a significant advantage to a non-adaptive adversary.
However, a bound for the advantage of an adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d, who can make both plaintext and ciphertext queries has not been computed yet. The significance of studying general distinguishers who can make adaptive queries is not hidden to anyone. Hence, it is important to study adaptive distinguishers. Allowing the adversary to make both plaintext and ciphertext queries strengthens the security results and has already appeared in the literature. Indeed, the Boomerang attack [Wag99] is an example of such an adversary. Studying these general distinguishers making adaptive plaintext-ciphertext queries allows us to, for example, interpret Wagner's Boomerang attack [Wag99] on COCONUT98 [Vau98b, Vau03] , a perfect 2-decorrelated block cipher and provably secure against differential and linear cryptanalyses and iterated attacks of order 1. Indeed, it could have resisted to Wagner's attack with a decorrelation of order 8.
In this paper, we are going to focus on adaptive iterated distinguishers who can make plaintext and ciphertext queries. We first define a generic adaptive plaintext-ciphertext d-limited distinguisher with an adversary who is making adaptive plaintext queries and ciphertext queries to the oracle depending on the previous queries. We, then, extend this definition to a generic adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguisher of order d. We prove the bound for the advantage of adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d against a 2d-decorrelated cipher. The appropriate metric for computing the advantage of this kind of adversary was defined by Vaudenay in [Vau99a] . It comes with no surprise that using this metric, we get a looser, i.e., higher, upper bound for adaptive distinguishers than that for non-adaptive distinguishers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some background results, notations, and definitions are summarized in Section 2. Section 3 defines generic adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguishers of order d and Section 4 computes the bound for such adversaries, encapsulating the main contribution of the paper. Appendix A and Appendix B give the details the proof of Theorem 7. Appendix C reminds linear and differential distinguishers.
Preliminaries
Vaudenay defines Decorrelation Theory based on the Luby-Rackoff Model [LR85] in which the adversary is unbounded in terms of computational power, but bounded in the number of d plaintext-ciphertext queries that he can make. In this model, there is an oracle Ω implementing either an instance of a random function (resp. permutation) drawn from all considered functions (resp. permutations) or an instance of a random function (resp. permutation) drawn uniformly at random from all random functions (resp. permutations). The aim of the adversary A is to guess which of two distributions the oracle Ω selects. There are two main types of adversaries: when the adversary makes his d queries at the same time and this is called a d-limited non-adaptive distinguisher; when the adversary makes queries depending on answers to previous queries and this is called a d-limited adaptive distinguisher.
Throughout the paper, F denotes a random function (or equivalently a function set up with a random key) from a set M 1 to a set M 2 while F * denotes an ideal random function from M 1 to M 2 drawn uniformly at random from all |M 2 | |M 1 | random functions. In addition, C denotes a random cipher (or equivalently the encryption function set up with a random key) over a message space M and C * denotes an ideal random cipher over M drawn uniformly at random from all |M|! permutations of M. Note that F * and C * are also denoted as a perfect function and a perfect cipher, respectively. In Table 1 , we provide some notations to be used throughout the paper. Figure 1 . Briefly, a test T generates the binary output T i of each iteration i, and then the acceptance set Acc produces the decision of the distinguisher based on the tuple (T 1 , . . . , T n ).
Input: an integer n, a set X, a distribution X on X, a test T , a set Acc Oracle: the oracle Ω implementing a permutation c The success of an adversary is often estimated by a measure called advantage defined as follows. Definition 1. Let F 0 and F 1 be two random functions. The advantage of an adversary A distinguishing F 0 from F 1 is defined by
When we consider all adversaries distinguishing between F 0 and F 1 and take the maximum of the advantage over all these adversaries in a class ζ, we get the best advantage of the distinguisher which is formulated as follows.
For example, ζ can consist of all non-adaptive adversaries or adaptive adversaries. Note that in the rest of the paper, when we mention the advantage of an adversary, we mean his best advantage. We now recall Decorrelation Theory by first giving the definition of the d-wise distribution matrix.
There are two main notions of matrix-norms used in this theory and recalled in the following definition.
Vaudenay [Vau03] defines the decorrelation of order d for a random function F as the distance between its d-wise distribution matrix and the d-wise distribution matrix of the ideal random function F * , namely
where D denotes one of the measures of distance given above. Deciding which matrix-norm to use depends on the type of distinguisher envisaged. While · ∞ is used for non-adaptive distinguishers,
Now, the following lemma relates the best advantage of a distinguisher with the decorrelation distance.
Theorem 4 (Theorems 10 and 11 in [Vau03] ). Let F and F * be a random function and the ideal random function, respectively. The respective advantages of the best d-limited non-adaptive and adaptive distinguishers, A NA(d) and A A(d) , are
and,
We recall one of the main theorems of this theory proving that if a cipher has decorrelation of order 2d, then it is secure against a nonadaptive iterated attack of order d.
Theorem 5 (Theorem 18 in [Vau03] ). Let C be a random cipher on a message space M of size M such that
, where C * is the ideal random cipher. Let us consider a non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d between C and C * with n iterations. We assume that the distinguisher generates sets of d plaintexts of independent and identically distributed in all iterations. Then, we can bound the advantage of the adversary as
where δ is the probability that any two different iterations send at least one query in common.
Lastly, we will remind the notion of indicator function.
Definition 6. Let S be the sample space and E ⊆ S be an event. The indicator function of the event E, denoted by 1 E , is a random variable defined as
The indicator function can shortly be denoted as 1 E instead of 1 E (s).
In the sequel, we define more general distinguishers, namely adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguishers of order d.
Adaptive Plaintext-Ciphertext Iterated Distinguishers of Order d
In this section, we recall two generic distinguishers, namely an adaptive plaintext-ciphertext d-limited distinguisher (see Figure 2 ) and an adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguisher of order d (see Figure 3 ). Both distinguishers are adaptive in a way that the adversary adaptively asks for both encryption and decryption of the queries. Herein we formalize these distinguishers. We first define a compact function G to be distinguished. The goal of defining this function is to specify the input to the oracle to be either encrypted or decrypted (as the adversary makes either the plaintext queries or the ciphertext queries in a specific order depending on his type of attack).
Let G be the set of functions G such that G : M × {0, 1} → M satisfying G(G(x, 0), 1) = x and G(G(x, 1), 0) = x, for all x. We denote G 0 (x) = G(x, 0) and G 1 (x) = G(x, 1) and point out G Input: a function F, a test T , a distribution R on {0, 1} * Oracle: the oracle Ω implementing either an instance of G or an instance of G * Pick r ∈ {0, 1} * at random from R Set u1 = (a1, b1) ← F(·; r) Finally, using a test T , he outputs a decision bit "1" if he guesses that Ω implements an instance of the random function G or "0" if he guesses that Ω implements an instance of the ideal random function G * .
Input: an integer n, a function F, a test T , a set Acc, a distribution R on {0, 1} * Oracle: the oracle Ω implementing a function G or G * for k = 1 to n Set T k (with independent coins) ← output of Distinguisher in Figure 2 end for Output 1Acc(T1, . . . , Tn) An adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d. The iterated distinguisher given in Figure 3 is simply the iteration of the d-limited distinguisher (see Figure 2 ) in a way that the adversary A AI(d) repeats the distinguisher n times, then he checks whether the output of n iterations are accepted or not with respect to a set Acc. This gives his final decision.
Input: an integer n, a set X, differences ∆ and ∇ Oracle: the oracle Ω implementing a permutation c for k = 1 to n Pick x1 uniformly at random from the set
Output 1 else Output 0
Fig. 4. Boomerang Distinguisher
The Boomerang Attack [Wag99] defined in Figure 4 is an example for an adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguisher of order d (see Figure 3) for the case d = 4. The adversary queries two (chosen) plaintexts and receives their corresponding ciphertexts, he then constructs two ciphertexts depending on the previous ciphertexts and asks for their decryption. The adaptively chosen queries to the oracle in each iteration of the Boomerang Attack [Wag99] can be written as (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 ) = ((x 1 , 0), (x 1 ⊕ ∆, 0), (c(x 1 ) ⊕ ∇, 1), (c(x 1 ⊕ ∆) ⊕ ∇, 1)), where x 1 is selected uniformly at random over the set X, and ∆ and ∇ denote non-zero differences.
Advantage of Adaptive Plaintext-Ciphertext Iterated Distinguishers of Order d
Vaudenay [Vau03] found a bound for the advantage of non-adaptive iterated distinguishers of order d, which is not apposite for the adaptive adversaries. We extend his result and provide a bound for the advantage of adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguishers of order d. Strictly speaking, we compute the maximum success of the adversary who is making d adaptive queries to the oracle in each iteration to distinguish a random cipher 2d-decorrelated upon using the · A norm.
, where G * is the ideal random cipher and |M| = M . Let us consider an adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d A AI(d) who is trying to distinguish G from G * by performing n iterations (see Figure 3) . Then, the advantage
where θ is the expected value of the probability that any two different iterations send at least one query in common for a given G.
Proof. Let one iteration consist of the input queries u = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u d ) and the output queries v = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v d ), where
We first make two observations about the adaptive adversary.
Observation 1: Inner-collisions in input queries, i.e., u i = u j , are not allowed, since calling the same query twice in the same iteration will not give any advantage to the adversary. Observation 2: Let (u i = (a i , b i ), v i ) and (u j = (a j , b j ), v j ) be two queries in the same iteration. Cross inner-collisions are not allowed, that is, we never have a i = v j and b i = b j . Getting the same information will not give any advantage to the adversary.
Notice that these aforementioned observations do not hold between different iterations. We begin similarly to the proof of Theorem 5 provided in [Vau03] . We first define T (g) to be the probability that the test function T outputs 1 when G = g (resp. G * = g), i.e.,
We let p (resp. p * ) be the probability of the distinguisher outputting 1, let Acc be the acceptance set, and T k (G) (resp. T k (G * )) be the output of iteration k. Then we have
Notice that all T k (G)'s are pairwise independent except that all are only dependent on G, and T k (G) = T (G). Hence, we obtain
Then, p can be rewritten as
for some integers a k such that 0 ≤ a k ≤ n k . Similarly, we have the same argument for p * , i.e.,
The advantage of the distinguisher, |p − p * |, is maximal when all a k 's are either 0 or n k depending on the distributions T (G) and T (G * ). Hence, we assume that Acc of the best distinguisher is of the form
for some set B ⊆ {0, . . . , n}. Thus, we rewrite p = E G [s(T (G))], where s(x) = k∈B n k x k (1 − x) n−k . Now, consider the derivative of s which can be written as
Notice that since the sum over all k, such that 0 ≤ k ≤ n, is the derivative of (x + (1 − x)) n , then the total sum is zero. Hence, we obtain
We note that when x ≥ 1/2, we have |s (x)| ≤ 2n. Similarly, when x < 1/2, we have |s (x)| ≤ 2n. Hence, we get |s (x)| ≤ 2n, for every x. So, according to the Mean Value Theorem, we have
Furthermore, Theorem 4 gives the exact advantage for the best adap-
We here notice that in Vaudenay's proof for Theorem 5, the non-adaptive case was considered which leads the same result.
We now define a new random variable T 2 (G) which is the output of another test with 2d entries, that is,
Thanks to Theorem 4, we have
More precisely, we have
In 1, we use
Afterwards, the advantage of the distinguisher is
By using Tchebichev's inequality, i.e., Pr
when λ = 3 (2V (T (G * )) + (3ε/2))/n. So far, everything works similarly to [Vau03] . However, the rest is different since the function implemented in the oracle has new properties. For further details of the proof up to now, refer to [Vau03] . Now, it is left to bound V (T (G * )).
Bounding V (T (G * )). We now bound V (T (G * )) by expanding it as
where S = {(v, r), (v , r ) ∈ T } and u (resp. u ) is defined by both r and v (resp. r and v ). For the sake of simplicity, we denote the expression
In order to find an upper bound for V (T (G * )), we first divide Expression (3) into two disjoint sums depending on whether or not u and u are colliding, i.e., if there exist i and j such that u i = u j . In detail, we have S = S 1 ∪ S 2 such that S 1 = (v, r), (v , r ) ∈ T | ∃i, j s.t. u i = u j and S 2 = (v, r), (v , r ) ∈ T | ∀i, j s.t. u i = u j . Thus, we write
We now bound each sum separately.
The sum over S 1 , S 1 P , is bounded as
where we denote
This can be interpreted as the expected value of the probability that any two iterations have at least one query in common for given G. Now, we provide a bound for the sum over S 2 , S 2 P , which is for non-colliding inputs u and u . We first note that since both G * 0 and G * 1 are from M to M, and, hence, bijective, they are indeed the ideal cipher C * , i.e., G * 0 = G * 1 = C * . Therefore, their distribution matrices will be the same as the distribution matrix of the ideal cipher C * . We define x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x d ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y d ) as
, with b i ∈ {0, 1}, is the input tuple and v = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v d ) is its corresponding output tuple. This is basically collecting the plaintexts and ciphertexts into two separate tuples. Now, the sum over S 2 can be rewritten into three disjoint sums as
Here, S 3 , S 4 and S 5 are the three partitions of S 2 , i.e., S 2 = S 3 ∪ S 4 ∪ S 5 , S 3 = (v, r), (v , r ) ∈ T | ∀i, j, k, m, e, f u i = u j , x k = x m , y e = y f ,
, and A is
. We now deal with these three sums.
The sum over S 3 (all non-colliding u's and u 's, all non-colliding x's and x 's, and all non-colliding y's and y 's), S 3 A, can be rewritten as
Here, since Pr
constant when there is no collision between x and x and between y and y , in Equality (4), we take it out from the sum. Afterwards, since we never have a i = v j and b i = b j according to Observation 2, there will not be any inner-collisions in x. Now, we bound Equality (4) as 1 2 Pr
Note that Inequality (5) is due to fact that the sum in (4) is bounded by the total number of v and v which is M 2d and P 1 ≥ P 2 2 . The way to obtain Inequality (6) is shown in Appendix A.
On the other hand, the sum over S 4 , S 4 A, will be the sum over all colliding y's and y 's, all non-colliding x's and x 's, and all non-colliding u's and u 's. When x and x are non-colliding, it is not possible to have colliding y and y . Hence, we have Pr G * 0 (x, x ) G * 0 − − → (y, y ) = 0. Therefore, the sum over S 4 will be negative, i.e., S 4 A ≤ 0.
Finally, we provide a bound for the sum S 5 , S 5 A, as
Here, we define
as the expected value of the probability that x and x collide when G is given and there is no collision between u and u . We get γ ≤ d 2 /M which is proved in Appendix B. Notice that Equality (7) gives the probability γ explicitly. Now, if we sum up all the results, then we have
When we substitute V (T (G * )) in (2), then we have
Allowing θ ≈ δ to compare Theorem 5 with Theorem 7, we observe that the bound for adaptive attacks is higher than the bound for non-adaptive attacks. This fact comes with no surprise. Adaptive adversaries are stronger than non-adaptive adversaries, in general, and adaptive queries can provide the adversary with some advantage.
Conclusion and Final Remarks
In this work, we study the resistance against adaptive plaintext-ciphertext iterated distinguishers of order d which has not been explored before. We prove the bound for this distinguisher in which the adversary is making adaptive plaintext and ciphertext queries to the oracle depending on the previous queries. This work contributes to proving the security of previous and future designs based on Decorrelation Theory since previously there was no clue with adaptive iterated adversaries in this context.
It is worth mentioning that Theorem 7, provided in this paper, poses two questions. The theorem proves that decorrelation of order 2d is sufficient for a cipher to resist an iterated attack of order d. The first question asks whether or not this condition is necessary. The second question is as follows: can the probability θ of having the same query in different iterations increase the advantage of our adaptive adversary? Not surprisingly, similar questions were posed by Theorem 5. Bay et al. [BMV12] have recently answered these questions by providing two counterexamples that are not intuitive. Namely, Bay et al. proceeded as follows for the questions in Theorem 5.
-The first question is answered by showing that the decorrelation of order 2d is necessary. They provide a 3-round Feistel construction decorrelated to the order 2d − 1, that is [C] 2d−1 − [C * ] 2d−1 A ≤ 2(2d − 1) 2 /q, where q is the cardinality of the finite field GF(q). They then perform a successful non-adaptive iterated distinguisher of order d against this cipher.
-The second one is answered by providing again a 3-round Feistel construction decorrelated to the order 2d such that [C] 2d − [C * ] 2d A ≤ 8d 2 /2 k , where 2 k is the number of elements in GF(2 k ). They construct even an iterated distinguisher of order 1 on this cipher, when δ is high.
These counter-intuitive examples can also be applied to our case since the Feistel ciphers used in the solution to both questions are decorrelated by the adaptive norm, and non-adaptive attacks are a subset of adaptive attacks. To conclude, thanks to [BMV12] , our two questions for Theorem 7 are immediately answered.
A Some Details of Bounding Expression 6
Hence, we will give the detailed upper bounding of the following expression d 2 /2M . Similarly, we have the same result for u and v. Thus, we bound γ as
C Linear and Differential Distinguishers
Input: an integer n, a set X, a distribution X on X, a set I, masks a and b Oracle: an oracle Ω implementing a permutation c for i = 1 to n Pick x1 at random from X Set y1 = c(x1) Set Ti = a · x1 ⊕ b · y1 end for if T1 + · · · + Tn ∈ I then Output 1 else Output 0
Fig. 5. Linear Distinguisher
Input: an integer n, a set X, a distribution X on X, differences α and β Oracle: an oracle Ω implementing a permutation c for i = 1 to n Pick x1 at random from X Set x2 = x1 ⊕ α Set y1 = c(x1), y2 = c(x2) Set Ti = 1 y 1 ⊕y 2 =β end for if T1 + · · · + Tn = 0 then Output 1 else Output 0 Fig. 6 . Differential Distinguisher
